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The Social and the Causal Concepts of Responsibility
Nelson Potter, Jr.
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

In a recent article in this journal Professor William L. Blizek argued that there is
a distinction between a social and a causal
concept of “responsibility,” and that understanding this can help us understand
the concepts of legal, societal, and moral
responsibility.1
He says that in cases like “X was responsible for the automobile accident,” the concept of responsibility is causal, not social.
He also mentions the example, “Faulty wiring was responsible for the fire,” an example
that makes it clear that sometimes “responsibility” has an entirely causal meaning,
“and may be equivalent to ‘causality.’”2
But he adds: “Other uses of ‘responsibility,’ however, suggest a concept which is
incompatible with the causal concept—a
social concept of responsibility.’”3 He gives
as an example “X is responsible for the decorations at the forthcoming gala ball.” This
statement, he says, cannot be translated
into a causal statement without changing
its meaning. He points out that one may
choose to accept or not accept responsibility for the decorations, but one cannot
choose to accept or not accept responsibility for an accident in the same way. Further, we may, in taking on a responsibility
sometimes “engage ourselves to take on a
vast, and antecedently unspecifiable range
of specific responsibilities,”4 and this fact
seems to show that the meaning of responsibility here is different from simple causal
responsibility. He also points out that the
social concept of responsibility allows for

imputation of responsibility for possible
rather than actual consequence—as, for example, when we impute the possible consequences of an unsuccessful assassination
attempt, or a careless and dangerous but,
in tenns of actual consequences, harmless
firing of one’s rifle. In contrast, when the
intended consequences are good (e.g., having a well-decorated gala ball), imputation
is for the actual bad consequences (as when
the decorations are badly done).
The causal and the social concepts of responsibility share the notions of (a) a causal
agent, and (b) some effect for which the
agent is a cause. But Professor Blizek argues
that the social concept has an additional element not shared by the causal concept: that
of an adjudicator, someone who imputes
responsibility.5 Thus he writes, “social responsibility is not a relationship between
cause and effect, but a relationship between
an agent and some consequence, as prescribed by an adjudicator.”6 He points out
that our judgments of the different kind of
social responsibility may change, as the society changes; redefinition of social responsibilities by a society is thus both a reflection of social change and a mechanism by
which it may take place.

1
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There is little to dispute in Professor
Blizek’s account of the role of the adjudicator in affixing the social concept of responsibility. But the claim that there is a different concept of causal responsibility which
does not involve any “adjudicator” is one
that Professor Blizek has not justified. In
the remainder of this essay I wish to show
that the causal concept of responsibility
requires an “adjudicator” as much as does
the social concept, and that the social concept of responsibility can be analyzed into
causal terms for the examples that Professor Blizek mentions. I shall not be attempting to show that his account of the social
concept of responsibility is incorrect; I shall
only show that he has not supported his
claim that there are two distinct conceptions of responsibility, one causal and the
other social.
Consider “X was responsible for the automobile accident.” We may flesh out this
example by supposing that X went through
a red light one foggy morning thereby
crashing into Y. Was X then the cause of
the accident? We may suppose that if X
hadn’t gone through the red light, the accident would not have occurred. But if Y
had not gone through the green light, the
accident also would not have occurred. Or
if Y’s light had also been red, or perhaps if
it had not been foggy, or if X had not had
an appointment, or if a policeman had been
directing traffic, or if V’s car had failed to
start that morning, the accident would not
have occurred. Thus the accident can be
said to have been caused by X, Y, Y’s green
light, X’s appointment, the fog, the fact that
V’s car started, and the absence of a policeman. How do we decide, from among the
items on this list, which we will finally, call
“the cause”? An adjudicator of some kind
determines which of the causes it is most
useful, or interesting, or enlightening to call
“the cause.”
This same account works for “Faulty wiring was responsible for (or was the cause of

cause of) the fire.” We may suppose that if
it had not been for the presence of faulty
wiring a fire would not have occurred. But
the fire also would not have occurred but
for the presence of combustible material,
oxygen in the atmosphere, electric current
passing through the wires, the absence of
an afternoon shower, the absence of a fireman within five feet of the wiring when it
heated up, and the earlier inability of the
owner to pay for rewiring. It is not very
interesting or enlightening or useful to say
that the fire was caused by the presence of
oxygen in the air, or the absence of a fireman, or the poverty of the owner. But such
statements may be nonetheless true; and it
is again an “adjudicator” who determines
that faulty wiring was “the cause” of the fire.
Now let us consider “X is responsible for
the decorations at the forthcoming gala
ball.” I think this may be read as “X has
promised that he will be the cause of good
or adequate decorations for that ball,” if
X took on the responsibility by making a
promise. The reason one can choose to take
on this responsibility in a way that one cannot choose with respect to one’s responsibility for an auto accident, is that one can
choose to be or not be the cause of future,
possible states of affairs, whereas one cannot choose to be or not be the cause of either an accident or a past event. When one
promises to be the cause of something,
he is often engaging himself “to take on a
vast, and antecedently unspecifiable range
ofspecific responsibilities.”7 For when one
promises to complete a task, one promises
to be the causally sufficient condition of its
completion, and the causally sufficient conditions of events are usually “vast and unspecifiable.” Thus the presence of vast and
unspecifiable ranges of responsibilities does
not point toward any non-causal conception of responsibility, but only toward the
concept of causally sufficient conditions.
The fact that X has promised to be the cause
of good or adequate decorations means he
is responsible if the decorations are bad,

7

See note 4.
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since he has then failed to keep his promise.
Cases where one is in some sense responsible for merely possible consequences can
be analyzed in terms of contrary-to-fact
conditionals. For our examples we get:
If the assassin had succeeded, his action
would have caused the death of a President.
If someone had been in the path of the
bullet, X’s firing would have caused his
injury or death.
But these are like:
If the wolf had succeeded, his action
would have caused the death of the elk.
If someone had been in the tornado’s path,
he would have been injured or killed.
We make judgments about possible or intended consequences, regardless of whether
there is any “social concept of responsibility” involved in the judgment or not. This is
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because we can learn from such judgments
about how to avoid certain kinds of bad
consequences. So the reference to possible
consequences is not a mark of a social as
opposed to a causal concept of responsibility; it is simply a mark of our general interest in avoiding certain kinds of bad causal
consequences.
Professor Blizek’s paper correctly points
out the role of the “adjudicator” in making judgments of responsibility. But I have
argued that the adjudicator’s role extends
to certain kinds of purely causal assignments of responsibility, especially those
which seek to discover “the cause” of an
occurrence. Some philosophers think that
the “causal concept of responsibility” is the
concept of a kind of responsibility that is
“objective” and non-relative, while the social concept of responsibility is adjudicatordependent’ perhaps in some way arbitrary,
and relative to human interests and purposes. In fact, the social and causal concepts
of responsibilityare equally adjudicator-dependent, equally “objective,” and equally
relative to human interests and purposes.

